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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to study both the private and the social desirability of a mixed
bundling strategy that generates a cost savings eﬀect. We conﬁrm that mixed bundling is the
dominant strategy for multiproduct ﬁrms, although it may give rise to a prisoner’s dilemma.
Moreover, we show that mixed bundling may maximise social welfare, provided that cost
savings are suﬃciently high. Finally, we highlight the parametric regions where the social
and the private interests coincide, and those where they do not. The recent evolution of
broadband telecommunications services provides an ideal framework to apply our theoretical
predictions.
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"The complexity of communication oﬀers and bundles has made it increasingly diﬃcult
to understand and compare service prices and characteristics. A lack of transparent
information about services and their prices makes consumer price comparisons more
diﬃcult and leads to market ineﬃciencies."
(Broadband Bundling: Trends and Policy Implications. OECD Digital Economy Pa-
pers, p. 4)
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1 Introduction
Mixed bundling, the practise adopted by many multiproduct ﬁrms to sell their products both
on a stand-alone basis and in bundles, is becoming more and more widespread in many diﬀerent
sectors. This occurs not only in high-tech industries such as telecommunications, video game
consoles, and hardware and software, but also in more traditional industries, such as music,
travel, and scientiﬁc publishing. Record companies, for example, now release both single songs
and the entire album. When booking a ﬂight, it has become more common to pay separately for
additional services that were once included, such as luggage and meal options. Likewise, in online
scientiﬁc publication, one has now the option to purchase a speciﬁc article without having to pay
for the whole journal edition.
One sector in particular has experienced a profound change: the telecommunications industry.
Cable companies started out oﬀering competing bundles including telephone service, high speed
internet connection, and digital cable. In turn, both traditional and newly born telephone com-
panies have responded by oﬀering discounted bundles comprising phone services, DSL connection
and satellite television services. The increasing digitalization of network services completed the
merging process between these once distinct service providers. Broadband Internet access has
rapidly expanded and the shift towards an all Internet protocol (IP) technology has enabled op-
erators to provide a variety of retail services over a single platform. The practice of bundling ﬁxed
telephony, pay television, broadband internet, and, more recently, mobile telephony, has increas-
ingly been adopted by diﬀerent operators.1 In addition to purchasing such double, triple or even
quadruple bundles, consumers usually also have the option of buying individual "components"
from diﬀerent operators, thereby creating their customized "system". The market is therefore
characterized by the massive use of mixed bundle strategies that may beneﬁt both producers and
consumers, given the potential cost savings generated by such practise.2
However, antitrust concerns have been raised, as bundling can be adopted to exclude potential
rivals from at least one of the reference markets, thus reducing competition.3 Moreover, bundling
has recently posed other problems for both competition authorities and sectoral regulators, which
1Bouckaert et al. (2010) analyse broadband penetration rates across 20 OECD countries in the 2003-2008
period. Greenstein and McDevitt (2011) estimated the economic value created by the diﬀusion of broadband from
1999 to 2006 in the United States. Calzada and Martínez-Santos (2014) show that in 2011 the percentage of
bundled plans among total broadband subscriptions was higher than 80% in France (93%), Portugal (88%), and
Spain (89%).
2 In fact, leaving aside strategic considerations, the economic reason that explains why separate goods can be
sold in packages usually refers to the presence of economies of scale and scope in production, together with reduced
transactions and information costs for consumers. In addition, bundling may also reduce billing and administrative
costs. The presence of such synergetic eﬀects explains why bundles are usually sold at a price which is lower than
the sum of the prices charged for stand-alone products.
3Following the seminal paper by Whinston (1990), the entry-deterrence use of bundling has been investigated
by Choi and Stefanadis (2001), Carlton and Waldman (2002), Nalebuﬀ (2004) and Peitz (2008), inter alii.
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face scenarios in continuous evolution, such as the double and triple-play product markets. In
particular, whereas the price of the bundled goods typically decreases, the price of stand-alone
components may increase.4 Consumers accustomed to buying all products from the same producer
gain from bundling, while those who prefer to "mix-and-match" may eventually lose out. It follows
that a careful analysis of the impact of mixed bundling on both ﬁrms’ proﬁtability and social
welfare would be recommended, independently of the use of such strategy to foreclose the market.
For all these reasons, the aim of our paper is to provide a theoretical analysis of the strategic
incentive that leads multiproduct ﬁrms to adopt mixed bundling in presence of cost savings eﬀects.
We build on a component model initially developed by Matutes and Regibeau (1988), Economides
(1989), and Economides and Salop (1992), and successively used by Choi (2008) and Maruyama
and Minamikawa (2009), among others. In particular, we consider two competing multiproduct
ﬁrms, each producing a speciﬁc version of two complementary goods/components, α and β, which
are valuable only when consumed together. Therefore, four possible horizontally diﬀerentiated
composite systems are available for consumers, given that we assume full compatibility between
components. We acknowledge that this is a strong assumption, since, in principle, consumers may
be interested in only one of the two components. However, especially in the telecommunication
industry, recent papers show that double and triple-play bundles are relevant product markets
and that the components of each bundle are perceived by consumers as complements which are
usually consumed together (Pereira and Ribeiro, 2011; Pereira et al., 2013).5
Firms are engaged in a non cooperative two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage they have to
decide whether to sell the two goods on a stand-alone basis, or to adopt mixed bundling. In the
second stage they compete in prices. A system composed by two complementary goods produced
by the same ﬁrm and sold in a package will be referred to as "bundled system", while a system
composed by two complementary goods produced by the two diﬀerent producers will be referred to
as "hybrid system". Based on the previous discussion on IP technology, we assume that bundling
allows to reduce the cost of producing/shipping the products. Potential gains for consumers in
terms of improved functionality and/or reduced search and assembly costs will not be considered.
Hence, in our analysis a crucial role will be played by the strategic eﬀect of mixed bundling in
the presence of cost savings on the producers’ side.
4Choi (2008) considers the controversial decision of the European Commission in 2001 to block the proposed
merger between General Electric and Honeywell on the basis of the possibility of bundling between GE’s jet aircraft
engines and Honeywell’s avionics products. One of the critical point raised by the European Commission was the
possibility that prices for stand-alone components would have increased after the merger. Greenlee et al. (2008)
demonstrate that bundled loyalty discounts have ambiguous welfare eﬀects precisely because they may favour the
increase of the price for stand-alone components.
5Pereira et al. (2013), for example, use data from Portugal and show that "the double-play product of ﬁxed
voice and ﬁxed broadband is a complement of the single-play product of subscription television. Similarly, the
single-play product of ﬁxed voice is a complement of the single-play product of subscription television and of the
single-play product of ﬁxed broadband" (p. 768).
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The results of our paper are as follows. First of all, we conﬁrm the ﬁnding (Thanassoulis,
2007; Maruyama and Minamikawa, 2009; inter alii) that mixed bundling is a dominant strategy
for both ﬁrms, and that they apply a discount on the price of the bundle. We also ﬁnd that,
although in most cases the prices of stand-alone components tend to increase when both ﬁrms
adopt mixed bundling, there are also instances where the opposite may occur. In particular, this
happens when marginal cost savings are high enough to even beneﬁt component prices, provided
the systems are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. The presence of signiﬁcant cost synergies may therefore
also favour those consumers who still prefer to assemble their composite system on a "mix-and-
match" basis. This extends previous studies in which cost savings were neglected and the price of
individual components always increased when producers opted for mixed bundling (Choi, 2008,
inter alii).
We then demonstrate that there exist circumstances where mixed bundling entails the highest
proﬁt for ﬁrms, thus solving the prisoner’s dilemma situation that has often been observed. Not
surprisingly, this occurs for (i) relatively high levels of marginal cost savings, independently of
the degree of diﬀerentiation across the systems, and (ii) when systems are perceived as extremely
substitutable, independently of cost savings. Moreover, this also holds (iii) when the systems are
suﬃciently diﬀerentiated and at least some synergetic eﬀects generated by bundling are at work.
This last case is relatively new in the literature and it deserves particular attention. In fact, our
analysis reveals that, by adopting mixed bundling, each ﬁrm enjoys a proﬁt gain from the sale of
the bundled system, while it suﬀers a proﬁt loss from the sale of hybrid systems. When cost savings
are intermediate, the balance between such gains and losses depends on the degree of product
substitutability in a non-monotonic way. This is due to the fact that, when systems become
progressively less diﬀerentiated, the discounted price associated to the bundle ﬁrst increases when
hybrid systems are still taken into account, and then decreases when consumers virtually neglect
such systems due to the strategic increase of the prices of stand-alone components.
Finally, when considering social welfare, we demonstrate that mixed bundling is beneﬁcial for
society at large when cost savings are suﬃciently high. Interestingly, the higher the degree of
product substitutability, the higher the cost savings required for mixed bundling to be socially
preferred compared to separate pricing. Indeed, as we noticed above, the discounted price asso-
ciated to the bundled products tend to decrease when the degree of product substitutability is
high. At the same time, in this parametric region, the prices for stand-alone components sub-
stantially increase with respect to separate selling. As such, consumers lose out under mixed
bundling, unless the cost savings eﬀect is relevant enough to signiﬁcantly contain the price surge
of stand-alone components, while at the same time still guaranteeing a convenient discount on
the price of the bundled system.
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In general, a careful examination of the diﬀerent parametric regions provides useful indications
about the desirability of an intervention to prohibit mixed bundling, and its consequences for
producers. In fact, we show that there exist parametric regions where the private and social
interests coincide. This consistently happens for relatively high levels of cost savings, given that
mixed bundling is both socially and privately proﬁtable. For intermediate cost savings, such
an incentive alignment depends not only on the degree of product substitutability, but also on
the measure of social welfare that one considers. When systems are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated,
consumers gain while ﬁrms may lose with mixed bundling. The opposite holds when systems
are highly substitutable. Based on total welfare, the decision to allow bundling or not represents
an attempt to mediate between the two welfare components, but may favour only one category
and damage the other, depending on the eﬀective cost reduction induced by bundling. Finally,
when cost savings are low, the policymaker should prohibit bundling. This would always beneﬁt
consumers, whose surplus is higher under separate pricing, but it may hurt ﬁrms when the degree
of substitutability is extremely high. On the contrary, prohibiting bundling would solve their
prisoner’s dilemma when systems are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated.
Literature and Positioning
Three papers are closely related to our analysis: Choi (2008), Maruyama and Minamikawa
(2009), and Flores-Fillol and Moner-Colonques (2011). They have in common an initial scenario
characterized by two diﬀerentiated brands of two complementary components, each oﬀered by
an independent producer, so that there are four ﬁrms. Moreover, they all focus on the eﬀect
of mergers in complementary markets, in which the merged ﬁrm can engage in mixed bundling.
Choi (2008) analyses the impact of mixed bundling on pricing decisions and derives relevant
welfare implications of mergers. In particular, he ﬁnds that the merged entity always increases
the prices for the stand-alone components. Although considering the possibility of a counter-
merger, his paper mainly focuses on the eﬀects on pricing, proﬁts and social welfare induced
by only one merger in the industry. Conversely, Maruyama and Minamikawa (2009) investigate
a symmetric market structure where both pairs of producers of complementary goods decide
whether or not to merge, and then to adopt mixed bundling. For this reason, their approach
is the closest to our model. They show that merging with bundling is the dominant strategy
for both pairs, despite giving rise to a prisoner’s dilemma when product diﬀerentiation is not
particularly high. Of particular interest for our analysis, they also discuss the consequences of
bundling in terms of social welfare and ﬁnd that merging with mixed bundling is never optimal.
Flores-Fillol and Moner-Colonques (2011) expand the previous models by introducing consumers
that derive utility from individual consumption of each of the four products. The new result in
their analysis is that the price for the product consumed alone may decrease after bundling. As
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a consequence, merging is not always an equilibrium strategy, as it becomes unproﬁtable when
markets for individual components are suﬃciently relevant.
In our paper, we follow Maruyama and Minamikawa (2009) and Choi (2008) and leave out
individual consumption. Diﬀerently from their analysis, however, we do not endogenise the
merging decision. Rather, we focus on the decision to bundle in presence of a cost savings eﬀect,
a point which has been neglected by previous contributions.6 This allows us to shed more light
on the strategic interaction characterising competition between operators which provide a variety
of services over the same platform, thereby enjoying signiﬁcant cost synergies.
As we already introduced, the combination of complementary components into composite
systems has been initially studied by Matutes and Regibeau (1988 and 1992) and Economides
and Salop (1992). They consider fully integrated ﬁrms and show that they prefer compatibility
over incompatibility. Einhorn (1992) analyses two vertically diﬀerentiated ﬁrms, each producing
both components of an integrated system. He demonstrates that, in equilibrium, they both
choose compatibility. Farrell et al. (1998) show that ﬁrms may prefer incompatibility with cost
heterogeneity in presence of at least three diﬀerent varieties of each component. Denicolò (2000)
analyses compatibility and bundling choices when a generalist ﬁrm oﬀering both components
competes against two specialist ﬁrms. He shows that incompatibility or pure bundling may be
proﬁtable for the generalist ﬁrm when one component is less diﬀerentiated than the other. In
Dalkir et al. (2002), a merger of quality component leaders beneﬁts the integrated entity, as it
results in higher proﬁts and increased market share.
More recently, Gans and King (2006) adopted the Hotelling model to analyse the use of
bundled discounts with unrelated products by two pairs of independent producers. They show
that the bundled discount is a dominant strategy for both pairs of ﬁrms. Armstrong and Vickers
(2010) built a model with heterogeneous consumers and elastic demand, in which consumers are
allowed to buy from more than one supplier. They ﬁnd that the impact on social welfare of
bundled discounts crucially depends on the combination between demand elasticity, consumer
heterogeneity and shopping cost levels. Thanassoulis (2007) points out that mixed bundling may
favour producers but reduce consumer surplus if buyers incur ﬁrm speciﬁc costs. Mialon (2014)
extends the standard diﬀerentiated products model used in Matutes and Regibeau (1992) to
analyse ﬁrms’ decision between a merger and a strategic alliance in bundling their product with
other complementary products.7
6A relevant exception is the paper by Evans and Salinger (2008), where bundling induces two types of cost
reduction. Similarly to our paper, the constant marginal cost of joint production is lower than the sum of the
constant marginal cost of separate production. In addition, in their analysis, bundling also reduces the ﬁxed cost
of production. However, the framework that they use is diﬀerent from ours, as they consider contestable markets,
thus neglecting strategic eﬀects.
7 In some way our paper is also linked to the literature that analyses strategic competition when there exists
at least one producer whose pricing activities interact with those of other ﬁrms selling components that represent
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Three other papers are related to our idea that the bundling and merging decision may be
aﬀected by the degree of product substitutability. Beggs (1994) studies endogenous merger for-
mation between two groups of ﬁrms where products within a group are complements, and those
across groups are substitutes. His model can be also applied in situations where producers of
complementary products engage in pure bundling. He ﬁnds that the producers of complementary
goods may refrain from merging in order to avoid counter-mergers by rival complementors that
would increase price competition. This occurs especially when market pressure is high. Venkatesh
and Kamakura (2003) analyse the eﬀect of the degree of substitutability on bundling and optimal
pricing. They show that there exists circumstances where a decrease in the degree of substitutabil-
ity favours the incentive to bundle. Mantovani and Vandekerckhove (2015) focus on merging and
(pure) bundling and consider the case where a pair of complementary producers moves before
the other. The equilibrium result depends on a combination between market pressure and timing
of the game. For intermediate levels of competitive pressure, both pairs of ﬁrms bundle when
the game is simultaneous, yet they are trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma. On the contrary, in the
sequential game, the ﬁrst movers merge, but refrain from bundling, as to not induce rivals to
counter-merge.
Finally, recent empirical contributions focus on the impact of bundling in the telecommunica-
tion industry. Pereira et al. (2013) show that triple-play bundles are a relevant product market
and discuss the impact of bundles on competition and regulatory policy. Calzada and Martínez-
Santos (2014) and Fageda et al. (2014) analyse the determinants of broadband Internet access
prices as well as the operators’ marketing strategies. The former paper is based on access prices
in a group of 15 EU countries between 2008 and 2011, and the authors show the eﬀect of diﬀerent
bundling on prices. They also examine the impact of competition and regulation on broadband
retail prices. The latter paper draws on data from the Spanish market between 2005 and 2011
and demonstrates, among other things, that the impact of bundles on prices is crucially aﬀected
by the development of the broadband market achieved by that country. Üner et al. (2015) focus
on the Turkish telecommunication sector, in which top leading telecom operators are not allowed
to oﬀer comprehensive bundles. They investigate the preference for bundle of a random sample
of 766 residential consumers across 14 large city centers and discover the presence of many op-
portunities for bundled services. While such empirical literature touches very interesting points
related to the proliferation of bundle activities in the telecommunication sector, these papers do
not consider the issue related to potential increase in prices for stand-alone products.
substitutes for each other. This literature was pionereed by Economides and Salop (1992) and has recently
resurfaced thanks to the work of Casadesus-Masanell, Nalebuﬀ and Yoﬃe (2008), Hermalin and Katz (2013), and
Mantovani and Ruiz-Aliseda (2015), inter alii.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the theoretical
model. Section 3 provides the solution of the two-stage and it characterizes the parametric region
in which mixed bundling constitutes a prisoner’s dilemma. In Section 4 we perform the welfare
analysis and draw policy suggestions. In Section 5 we conﬁrm the robustness of the results
obtained in the baseline model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The theoretical model
We build our theoretical model on the framework introduced by Economides and Salop (1992) to
examine the incentive for producers of complementary products to adopt mixed bundling. Con-
sider two products or services, α and β, which are valuable for customers only when used together,
on a one-to-one basis. There are two diﬀerentiated brands of each component α and β. Unlike
Economides and Salop (1992) and the following literature on this topic, we leave out the incentive
for producers of complementary products to merge. Rather, we consider two multiproduct ﬁrms,
denoted by i, i = 1, 2, each of them producing a variety of both components α and β. Consumers
can buy both components from the same ﬁrm, or "mix-and-match" the components produced by
diﬀerent ﬁrms. Complementarities arising from higher functionality/compatibility when buying
both components from the same producers are not taken into account.8 Therefore, four equally
performing composite systems are available in the market: α1β1, α1β2, α2β1, α2β2.
Formally, the prices of brands αi and βi are respectively given by pαi and pβi , i = 1, 2. For
simplicity of notation, q11 indicates the demand for α1β1, and so on. The price for each system
is given by the sum of the prices of the two components, where pij = pαi +pβj indicates the price
of system αiβj , with i, j = 1, 2. The four systems αiβj are substitute for one another, thus their
demand qij is decreasing in its own price, pij , and increasing in the prices of the other systems.
Following Choi (2008) and Maruyama and Minamikawa (2009), we assume that the four systems
are equally substitutable. Without loss of generality, we also normalize both demand intercept
and own-price elasticity to 1. The four demand functions are linear and symmetric, and given by
q11 = 1− p11 + γ(p12 + p21 + p22), (1)
q12 = 1− p12 + γ(p11 + p21 + p22), (2)
q21 = 1− p21 + γ(p11 + p12 + p22), (3)
q22 = 1− p22 + γ(p11 + p12 + p21). (4)
where γ represents the symmetric cross-price elasticity of demand, with the restriction γ < 1/3
8Using the deﬁnition introduced by Stremersh and Tellis (2002), our paper is therefore about price bundling and
not about product bundling, where the integration of separate components in the bundle improves the performance
of the system, thereby raising consumers’ reservation price
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due to the fact that composite systems are assumed to be gross substitutes.9
The two multiproduct ﬁrms engage in a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, they simultaneously
decide whether to sell the products only on a stand-alone basis or to adopt mixed bundling. In
the second stage, upon observing their sale strategies, they set market prices.
As previously introduced and motivated by the recent evolution of the telecommunications
sector, we assume that bundling gives rise to synergetic eﬀects in production captured by a
reduction in the marginal cost. In particular, while the provision of each single component entails
a symmetric marginal cost equal to c per unit, when the ﬁrm sells the two products in a package
(or it provides the two retail services over the same platform), it beneﬁts from a cost reduction
captured by θ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the marginal cost of the bundled system reduces to c(1+θ). Notice
that c(1− θ) can be interpreted as a measure of the cost savings eﬀect: the higher its value (the
lower is θ), the higher the (marginal) cost synergy enjoyed by the ﬁrm when selling the two goods
together.10 To keep our analysis as simple as possible, we assume that θ = 0, meaning that the
production/provision of the bundled goods only implies a marginal cost equal to c, instead of 2c.
This is without loss of generality, as it will be discussed in Section 4.11 To summarize:
Assumption 1: The marginal cost of producing/providing the two complementary compo-
nents of each system is equal to the marginal cost of producing each single component.
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, notice that one of the consequences of adopting
Assumption 1 is that parameter c becomes an "indirect" measure of cost savings; the higher its
value, the more the ﬁrms save with mixed bundling.
9The four demand functions can be initially written as follows
q11 = σ − ηp11 + γp12 + δp21 + ǫp22
q12 = σ − ηp12 + γp11 + δp22 + ǫp21
q21 = σ − ηp21 + γp22 + δp11 + ǫp12
q22 = σ − ηp22 + γp21 + δp12 + ǫp11
where σ, η, γ, δ > 0 and η > γ+δ+ǫ because the composite products are gross substitutes. By assuming γ = δ = ǫ,
we obtain that η > 3γ. Parameter σ represents market size, while η and γ respectively reﬂect the own-price and
the cross-price elasticity of demand. Finally, normalizing to 1 both demand intercept and the own-price elasticity
(σ = η = 1) implies that the cross-price elasticity of demand γ is such that γ < 1/3, and the demand functions
are then simpliﬁed as in (1)-(4).
10Pereira and Vareda (2013) state: "The digitalization of electronic communication networks and the adoption of
packet switching implied that seemingly diﬀerent services, such as voice, data and subscription television services,
became simply a stream of packets, susceptible of being delivered over a single network.[...] Under these circum-
stances, both telecommunications ﬁrms and cable television ﬁrms have the ability to oﬀer all of these services, and
incentives to do so in bundles.[...] Bundling may emerge due to the type of technological reasons described above,
in which case it will typically involve cost reductions." (p. 531).
11 In Section 5 we demontrate that the main results of the theoretical model still hold if we consider θ ∈ (0, 1).
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3 The solution of the game
The ﬁrst part of this section considers the second stage of the game and it highlights the impact
of mixed bundling on prices and ﬁrms’ proﬁts. We ﬁrst consider the case of separate pricing, our
benchmark scenario. We then study the asymmetric situation in which only one ﬁrm adopts mixed
bundling. We complete the analysis with the case in which both ﬁrms adopt mixed bundling.
In the second part of the section we deﬁne the equilibrium of the game by considering the ﬁrst
stage in which both players decide whether to adopt mixed bundling or not. A detailed discussion
about the proﬁtability of mixed bundling in presence of cost savings will be provided.
3.1 The market stage
The benchmark case: separate pricing
When both ﬁrms sell the products on a stand-alone basis, proﬁts are given by:
π1 = (pα1 − c)(q11 + q12) + (pβ1 − c)(q11 + q21), (5)
π2 = (pα2 − c)(q21 + q22) + (pβ2 − c)(q12 + q22), (6)
where c indicates the marginal cost of production, as previously mentioned. Using F.O.C.s,
equilibrium prices can be easily obtained:
pIIαi = p
II
βi
=
2 + c(3− 5γ)
7− 17γ , i = 1, 2. (7)
Additional superscript II indicates equilibrium variables when both ﬁrms opt for independent
(or separate) pricing. Equilibrium proﬁts amount to:
πIIi =
8(3− 5γ)[1 + 2c(3γ − 1)]2
(7− 17γ)2 , i = 1, 2. (8)
Equilibrium prices, quantities, and proﬁts are always positive under the assumption that γ < 1/3,
as it can be easily demonstrated.12
The asymmetric case: only one ﬁrm adopts mixed bundling
Suppose now that ﬁrm 1 resorts to mixed bundling, while ﬁrm 2 does not. The only diﬀerence
with respect to demand system (1)-(4) is given by the presence of a price pB1 instead of p11,
where pB1 indicates the unique price for the bundle α1β1. Firm 1 now charges a price for the
bundle and two separate prices for each component sold on a stand-alone basis. According to our
12Equilibrium quantities are not reported in the text in order to reduce the number of expressions that we
display. However, they can be easily obtained, and they are available upon request.
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assumption, the production of the bundled systems implies a total cost of c, instead of 2c. Proﬁt
functions become:
π1 = (pB1 − c)q11 + (pα1 − c)q12 + (pβ1 − c)q21 (9)
π2 = (pα2 − c)(q21 + q22) + (pβ2 − c)(q12 + q22). (10)
Using F.O.C.s, equilibrium prices can be easily computed:
pBIB1 =
11− 9γ + c[11 + γ(14γ − 27)]
22− 74γ + 48γ2 , (11)
pBIα1 = p
BI
β
1
=
4− 3γ + c[3− 2γ(3− γ)]
11 + γ(24γ − 37) , (12)
pBIα2 = p
BI
β
2
=
(1− γ)[3 + 5c(1− 2γ)]
11 + γ(24γ − 37) . (13)
Additional superscript BI indicates equilibrium variables when ﬁrm 1 resorts to mixed bundling,
while the other keeps independent pricing. Notice that:
pBIB1 < p
BI
α2
+ pBIβ
2
< pBIα1 + p
BI
β
1
. (14)
As a consequence, the price for the bundle is lower than the sum of the prices for the stand-
alone products. The pressure to reduce the prices of the stand alone products is stronger for the
non-bundling ﬁrm. Moreover, by comparing (12)-(13) with (7) we ﬁnd that:
pBIα1 = p
BI
β
1
> pIIα1 = p
II
β
1
, (15)
pBIα2 = p
BI
β
2
< pIIα2 = p
II
β
2
. (16)
Hence, with respect to separate selling, the prices for the stand-alone products rise only for the
ﬁrm that bundles, while the rival has to lower its prices as it faces competition from the bundled
system. Therefore, we conﬁrm that Choi’s result (2008, Proposition 1, p. 562) can also extend
to the case where both producers of complementary goods have already merged, but only one of
them bundles and beneﬁts from cost savings.
Equilibrium proﬁts amount to:
πBI1 =
3 ·Φ+ 2c(1− 2γ)(29− 27γ)[γ(51− 32γ)− 13] + c2(1− 2γ) ·∆
4[11 + γ(24γ − 37)]2 , (17)
πBI2 =
2(3− 5γ) {2c[3− γ(11− 7γ)]− 3(1− γ)}2
[11 + γ(24γ − 37)]2 , (18)
Φ = [83− γ(290− 299γ + 96γ2)],
∆ ≡ 633− γ {4952− γ[13261− 2γ(6929− 2464γ)]} .
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Equilibrium prices, quantities, and proﬁts are positive under the additional condition that
c ≤ min{c, 1}, where c ≡ 8− 5γ(5− 3γ)
16− γ[89− 3γ(51− 26γ)] .
13 In the remainder of the analysis, the
following holds:
Assumption 2 c ≤ min{c, 1}.
In other words, we assume that a positive demand always exists for the four systems, even in
the asymmetric case where one multiproduct ﬁrm chooses not to bundle while its rival does.14
Both ﬁrms adopt mixed bundling
We now consider the last case, in which both ﬁrms resort to mixed bundling. The demand
system can be easily obtained by respectively replacing p11 with pB1 and p22 with pB2 , which
indicates the price for the bundle α2β2 charged by ﬁrm 2. Proﬁt functions write:
π1 = (pB1 − c)q11 + (pα1 − c)q12 + (pβ1 − c)q21, (19)
π2 = (pB2 − c)q22 + (pα2 − c)q21 + (pβ2 − c)q12. (20)
Taking F.O.C.s, equilibrium prices are:
pBBBi =
1 + c(1− 2γ)
2− 5γ , (21)
pBBαi = p
BB
βi
=
2[1 + c(1− 2γ)]
6− 15γ , i = 1, 2. (22)
Additional superscript BB indicates that both ﬁrms make use of the mixed bundling strategy.
The next result is straightforward:
pBBBi < p
BB
αi
+ pBBβi , i = 1, 2. (23)
As in the previous case, the price for the bundle is lower than the sum of the prices for the
independent products sold by the same ﬁrm. We postpone further discussion on the eﬀect on
prices to the next subsection.
Equilibrium proﬁts are given by:
πBBi =
17− 32γ + c(1− 2γ) {146γ − 50 + c[41 + γ(319γ − 228)]}
9(2− 5γ)2 , i = 1, 2. (24)
Equilibrium prices, quantities and proﬁts are always positive under the basic assumptions of our
model, i.e. γ < 1/3 and c ≤ min{c, 1}.
13 In particular, the condition c ≤ c derives from qBI
12
= qBI
21
≥ 0; moreover, we have to take into account that
c < 1. It is easy to ﬁnd that c < 1 when γ < 0.2.
14 Indeed, without this assumption, only two systems would be present in the market, i.e. α1β1 and α2β2.
Moreover, for even higher values of c, the non-bundling ﬁrm may exit the market, allowing its opponent to
monopolize the market.
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3.2 To bundle or not to bundle?
We can now solve the two-stage game and obtain subgame perfect Nash equilibria. The following
result holds:
Proposition 1 The game presents a unique Nash Equilibrium in dominant strategies in which
both producers adopt mixed bundling. Such an equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient when γ >
0.308 and when c ∈ (cN , c¯) if γ ≤ 0.308,whereas it gives rise to a prisoner’s dilemma when
c ∈ (0, cN ] if γ ≤ 0.308.
Proof. See Appendix, where we also report the precise value of cN , which is non-negative when
γ  0.308.
Each ﬁrm would always bundle, if the rival continued to sell its products on a stand-alone
basis. Likewise, each ﬁrm would respond by bundling as well, if the rival bundles. Hence, under
the assumptions of the model, ﬁrms always adopt mixed bundling, thus showing that the results
found by Maruyama and Minamikawa (2009, Proposition 1, p. 66) extend to our scenario. We
also compare equilibrium prices (7) with (21)-(23) and ﬁrst conﬁrm that the price charged for
the bundle is always lower than the sum of the prices of stand-alone components. Then, when
γ is suﬃciently high (γ > 0.285), we ﬁnd that each multiproduct ﬁrm increases the prices of
stand-alone components. However, when γ ≤ 0.285, the following result holds:
pBBBi < p
II
αi
+ pIIβi < p
BB
αi
+ pBBβi if c ∈

0, cP

, i = 1, 2. (25)
pBBBi < p
BB
αi
+ pBBβi < p
II
αi
+ pIIβi if c ∈ [cP , c), i = 1, 2. (26)
Corollary 1 With respect to separate pricing, when both ﬁrms adopt mixed bundling, the prices
of stand-alone components rise when c < cP , whereas they decrease in c ∈ [cP , c), where
cP ≡ 2(1 − 2γ)/[4 − γ(13 − 7γ)] < c. Notice that cP < 1 only when γ  0.285. Hence,
component prices always increase when γ > 0.285.
It follows that ﬁrms oﬀer not only a price discount for the bundle, but they may also charge
a lower price for stand-alone components. This is a new result as compared to previous papers.
In particular, stand-alone components are cheaper under bundling when c ∈ [cP , c), provided
the degree of substitutability between systems is not too high (γ  0.285). Moreover, the more
intense the degree of product substitutability, the higher the cost savings required for the hybrid
systems to be cheaper under bundling. In other words, we ﬁnd that cP is increasing in γ. This
reveals a contrasting eﬀect of γ and c on the component price diﬀerential. Consider, for example,
pBBαi − pIIαi . Obviously, both stand-alone component prices pBBαi and pIIαi tend to increase in both
γ and c. However, they diﬀerently react to changes in these parameters. Indeed, on the one hand
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we have:
∂(pBBαi − pIIαi)
∂γ
> 0. (27)
This means that pBBαi increases more than p
II
αi
when product substitutability augments, given that
ﬁrms are interested in reducing the competitive pressure in the market by making hybrid systems
less attractive. On the other hand,
∂(pBBαi − pIIαi)
∂c
< 0, (28)
and pBBαi rises less than p
II
αi
when c increases, as ﬁrms enjoy cost reductions in the bundled systems
which are also "transferred" to the stand-alone components. For this reason, when c ∈ [cP , c), we
obtain that pBBαi < p
II
αi
. However, when γ > 0.285, the substitutability eﬀect always dominates
the cost savings one, and pBBαi > p
II
αi
. Systems are perceived as extremely substitutable, and
producers have to charge very high prices for individual components in order to render hybrid
systems unattractive.
The results of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 are represented in Figure 1, where the dashed
area can be disregarded, following Assumption 2.15
Figure 1 : The solution of the game
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In primis, the above ﬁgure reveals two ﬁndings that are not surprising with respect to the
possible solution to the prisoner’s dilemma. In particular, both ﬁrms gain with bundling when: (i)
the synergetic eﬀect induced by such practise is extremely relevant, independently of the degree
15Note that the bottom half of the ﬁgure has been rescaled in order to focalize on the important aspects that
we want to highlight.
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of product substitutability captured by γ, and (ii) systems are very substitutable (γ ≥ 0.308),
independently of the level of cost savings measured by c. The former result is a direct consequence
of the way we model cost savings, although it highlights that prices for independent components
may even decrease, as reported in Corollary 1. When c = 1/2, for example, ﬁrms always gain
by bundling, although prices for stand-alone products increase. The latter result is already well
accepted in the literature (Matutes and Regibeau, 1992; Maruyama and Minamikawa, 2009; inter
alli) and it is explained by the fact that (mixed) bundling is usually adopted to soften competition
when the degree of substitutability across systems is particularly high. This is valid also for very
low values of cost savings, as one can see by considering the case in which c = 1/100.
Our analysis reveals a third case in which mixed bundling is beneﬁcial for ﬁrms. In particular,
this occurs when (iii) at least a certain degree of cost savings are present (c = 1/10, for example;
more on this value later), and the systems are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (γ < 0.308). When this
happens, ﬁrms avoid the prisoner’s dilemma in c ∈ (cN , c¯); however, the interplay between c and
γ becomes so puzzling that cN is non-monotone in γ. This is a crucial result of our paper, and
it deserves particular attention, as diﬀerent forces are simultaneously at work. In order to have
an economic interpretation, we need to understand what happens to total proﬁts, prices, and
demands when ﬁrms adopt mixed bundling vis à vis the benchmark case represented by separate
pricing. We can decompose the proﬁts into two main components to demonstrate that:
Lemma 1 As compared to separate pricing, when both ﬁrms adopt mixed bundling, they enjoy
a proﬁt gain from the sale of the bundled system, while they suﬀer a proﬁt loss from the
sale of the hybrid systems.
Proof. See Appendix.
From Corollary 1 we know that prices for stand-alone components may rise or fall. When
they increase, it can be easily demonstrated that the price surge does not compensate for the
demand reduction. In general, the demand for hybrid systems always shrinks when ﬁrms adopt
bundling. Hence, also in the parametric region where hybrid systems are cheaper (c ∈ [cP , c)),
their demand turns out to be lower than under separate selling, given that bundle systems are
indeed more convenient. This explains why the proﬁt accruing from hybrid systems diminishes
under bundling. As for the bundled system, it guarantees a proﬁt gain as compared to separate
pricing. Its price is always lower than the sum of the prices of stand-alone components, however
the increase in the demand (at the expenses of hybrid systems) more than compensates for the
discounted price.
It is also shown in the Appendix that an increase in γ expands the gain in the bundled system
while simultaneously aggravates the losses in the hybrid systems. On the contrary, while such gain
typically increases in c, the losses decrease with the intensity of cost savings. Hence, it is again the
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interplay between c and γ which becomes crucial. When γ > 0.308, the gain is always higher than
the loss, thus solving the prisoner’s dilemma. When γ ∈ [0, 0.308], the proﬁtability of bundling at
the ﬁrms’ level is determined by the intensity of marginal cost savings, as Proposition 1 suggests.
Figure 2 represents gains and losses for the three diﬀerent values of c previously represented in
Figure 1 as well:
Figure 2 : Bundled system’s gain and hybrid systems’ losses
1/3γ 1/3γ 1/3γ
c = 1/100 c = 1/10 c = 1/2
gain

loss

gain

loss

loss

gain

For low values of c, exampliﬁed by c = 1/100, the gain in the bundled system is obviously
scarce, while the losses from the hybrid systems, although not very signiﬁcant, are usually higher
than the gain, unless systems are very substitutable. In fact, only for high values of γ, does
the bundling strategy pay oﬀ. For suﬃciently higher values of c the opposite holds, and the
bundling strategy is always Pareto eﬃcient, as one can when c = 1/2. Finally, notice that for
intermediate values of c (c = 1/10), the two curves intersect twice, thus contributing to explain
the non-monotone shape of cN appearing in Figure 1. In order to obtain more insight, however,
let us consider the bundled discount, deﬁned as
D =
pBBBi − (pIIαi + pIIβi)
 . (29)
While all the other price and quantity diﬀerences (in absolute values) are always increasing in
γ, as it can be easily ascertained, when it comes to the discount we ﬁnd that ∂D/∂γ ≷ 0 in
c ∈ (0, 1). In particular,
∂D
∂γ
≥ 0 when γ ≤ 85 + 201c− 2

(5 + c)(17 + 8c)
255 + 511c
≡ γ. (30)
In the right panel of Figure 3, we represent D under the assumption that c = 1/10, while in the
left panel of the same ﬁgure we report the representation already appearing in Figure 1, limiting
our analysis to c ∈ (0, 1/2). In this interval, ﬁrms increase the price of stand-alone components
when adopting mixed bundling, and such a price surge is increasing in γ, as it is already known.
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Figure 3 : Explaining the prisoner’s dilemma
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Consider the left panel of Figure 3 at c = 1/10 and start at point A. Notice from the right
panel that, for low γ, the discount proposed by both producers on their respective bundled system
is moderate. Nonetheless, for such an intermediate value of cost savings, this discount is such
that the increase in the demand of the bundled system more than compensates for the decrease
in the demand of hybrid systems. Thus, ﬁrms are gaining from the bundled system, thanks
to cost savings, and not losing too much from the hybrid systems, whose prices are subject to
a contained increase (low γ), and whose demand is not crowded out by the bundle discount.
Consumers indeed still perceive the systems as suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. The balance of gains
and losses is therefore in favour of mixed bundling, which ensures a consistent gain in the bundle
system in front of relatively small losses in the hybrid systems.
On the contrary, in point B the game is characterized by a prisoner’s dilemma. Systems are
more substitutable than in point A, which implies a simultaneous increase in the price of stand-
alone components (and a higher loss in such systems), and a consistent discount for the bundled
systems, as it can be noticed from the right panel of Figure 3. For such intermediate levels of
product substitutability, ﬁrms still care about both their respective bundled system and the two
hybrid systems. However, in the attempt to capture more and more consumers, each ﬁrm has to
oﬀer a large discount, thereby eroding the proﬁt gain that derives from the bundled system.
Finally, in point C, the four systems are extremely substitutable and consumers tend to neglect
the hybrid systems given that similar alternative are oﬀered at a discount. However, precisely
for the fact that hybrid systems are virtually not an option, then competition between bundled
systems smooths out, thus allowing ﬁrms to reduce the discount. This can be observed in the
right panel of Figure 3 for relatively high values of γ. Hence, each producer is able to recoup
some gains when selling the bundle system with respect to the previous case, thus contributing
to explaining the private proﬁtability of mixed bundling in such an interval region.
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4 Welfare analysis
In this section we evaluate the impact of the bundling decision carried out by ﬁrms on consumer
surplus and total welfare. Recall from Proposition 1 that mixed bundling is a dominant strategy
for both ﬁrms. The following result holds:
Lemma 2 Mixed bundling beneﬁts consumers when c ≥ cC , while it maximises total welfare
when c ≥ cS. Both cCand cS are increasing in γ. Moreover, cS ≥ cC when γ ∈ (0, 0.295].
When c < cS, total welfare is maximised under separate pricing.
Proof. See Appendix, where we also report the precise expression of cS and cC .
The threshold values cS and cC are represented in Figure 4, together with cN . When the cost
savings eﬀect is substantial (relatively high values of c), both consumers and producers unam-
biguously gain from bundling. Consider lower levels of c. When systems progressively become
less diﬀerentiated, the prices for stand-alone components tend to increase while the discount for
the bundled systems initially augments and then shrinks. As we noticed in the previous section,
this has contrasting eﬀects on ﬁrms’ proﬁtability, thus explaining the shape of cN . As for con-
sumers, this means that, the higher the value of γ, the higher the cost savings eﬀect required for
mixed bundling to increase their surplus with respect to separate pricing. One can notice that
cS represents a sort of "mediation" between cN and cC . It is also evident that cC increases more
rapidly when cN starts decreasing in γ, precisely for the fact that the bundle discount diminishes,
as we know from (30).
Figure 4 : Consumer surplus, proﬁt and social welfare
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The following proposition summarizes the most relevant results in terms of comparing the
private and social incentive to bundle:
Proposition 3 The decision of the two multiproduct ﬁrms to adopt mixed bundling:
(I) is Pareto eﬃcient and it also maximises consumer surplus when c ∈ maxcN , cC , c, and
mixed bundling is therefore socially eﬃcient;
(II) maximises consumer surplus but results in a prisoner’s dilemma when γ ∈ (0, 0.295] and
c ∈ cC, cN, and mixed bundling is socially eﬃcient only when c ∈ cS, cN;
(III) does not maximise consumer surplus and it generates a prisoner’s dilemma when c ∈
0,min

cN , cC

, hence separate pricing would be socially eﬃcient;
(IV) is Pareto eﬃcient but does not maximise consumer surplus when γ ∈ (0.295, 1/3] and
c ∈ maxcN , 0 , cC ; mixed bundling is socially eﬃcient only when c ∈ cS, cC.
Proof. The results of Proposition 3 can be easily obtained by combining the results of Propo-
sition 1 and those of Lemma 2.
In Figure 4 we represent the four regions described in Proposition 3. In Region I the bundling
activity generates a suﬃciently high cost savings eﬀect to beneﬁt both producers and consumers.
Such an eﬀect has to be comparatively higher for intermediate values of γ, otherwise ﬁrms would
lose from bundling given the signiﬁcant price reduction required for bundled systems to be com-
petitive. In Region II product substitutability is not excessive and cost savings are intermediate.
Consumers always gain but producers are trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma. In terms of total wel-
fare, bundling is socially eﬃcient only in Subregion IIa, where the cost savings is suﬃciently high
to guarantee that the gain enjoyed by consumers overcomes the proﬁt loss suﬀered by producers.
In subregion IIb the opposite holds, and bundling should be prohibited. This would beneﬁt pro-
ducers, but damage consumers, who would still prefer mixed bundling. In Region III, the cost
savings eﬀect is too low to beneﬁt consumers. Moreover, the intensity of product substitutability
is not enough for producers to avoid the prisoner’s dilemma. Here separate pricing would in-
crease both consumers surplus and ﬁrms’ proﬁts, and the social planner should therefore prohibit
bundling. Finally, in Region IV another conﬂict of interests between producers and consumers
takes place. Contrary to Region II, in Region IV product substitutability is very intense. It fol-
lows that producers gain, whereas consumers suﬀer, as shown in the previous analysis. The loss
for consumers is higher than the gain for producers in Subregion IVa, where the cost savings eﬀect
is limited. The opposite holds in Subregion IVb, where bundling should be allowed, although still
damaging consumers with respect to independent selling.
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The above analysis reveals that social and private incentives for mixed bundling are often not
aligned. Moreover, the interval regions where ﬁrms and society disagree may change, depending
on the measure of social welfare taken into account. In fact, if one considers total welfare, then
bundling should be prohibited when c < cS. Such a decision would however hurt consumers
in Subregion IIb, where they would have actually beneﬁted from consistent discounts on the
bundled systems. On the contrary, focusing again on total welfare, bundling should be allowed
in Subregion IVb. Here consumers would lose from bundling; compared to separate pricing, not
only stand-alone components become extremely expensive, but the discounts on bundled systems
are also not that substantial.
5 Robustness of the Baseline Model
One of the most important assumption of our model regards the extreme synergetic eﬀect induced
by bundling. Following Assumption 1, we carried out the calculations for the three possible
scenarios (independent pricing, one ﬁrm adopting mixed bundling, both ﬁrms adopting mixed
bundling) and the relative comparisons assuming that θ = 0. However, one may wonder what
happens when θ ∈ (0, 1). In such a case, θ becomes a precise inverse measure of the cost savings
eﬀect. As we noticed in Section 2, the higher its value (or, the lower the value of (1 + θ)), the
lower the cost synergy brought forth by selling the two complementary products in a bundle.
Consider then θ ∈ (0, 1). The benchmark case (separate pricing) does not change, while the
equilibrium values for prices, proﬁts and social welfare in both the asymmetric case and in the
symmetric case in which both ﬁrms bundle now depend on θ. Such expressions, although not
reported here, are still tractable. However, when turning to comparing proﬁts and social welfare
expressions, the threshold values of c become extremely long. For this reason, we decided to omit
them from the current analysis.
It is however possible to demonstrate that all the results stated in Propositions 1 and 2 are still
valid, at least when some sort of cost savings eﬀect is present.16 The only diﬀerence is represented
by the fact that the interval regions reported in Figure 4 are aﬀected by θ. More precisely, all
the relevant threshold values of c increase in θ, as one can also easily guess. Indeed, the lower
the cost savings eﬀect, the lower the parametric region in which bundling is both privately and
socially eﬃcient (or, the higher the threshold value of c above which bundling is both privately
and socially beneﬁcial). The graphical representation provided in Figure 5 allows one to easily
interpret the consequences of considering progressively higher values of θ on the main results that
we found in the baseline model.
16A formal demonstration can be provided upon request, together with the precise expressions of the threshold
values of c that depend on θ.
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Figure 5 : Private and social incentives when θ=0.3, θ=0.6, θ=0.9, θ=1
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In particular, what we can therefore learn from considering diﬀerent values of θ is that only the
relative dimensions of our main regions change, but not the results. The only relevant exception
is represented by θ = 1. In this extreme case, cost savings are ruled out, and only regions III
and IVa persist. This replicates the results obtained by Maruyama and Minamikawa (2009) if
one considers only multiproduct ﬁrms. Firms adopt mixed bundling, and they are caught in a
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prisoner’s dilemma when γ < 0.3084. Moreover, the bundling decision is never socially optimal,
independently on the measure of social welfare that one considers. It follows that such a market
practise should be tout court prohibited. Apart from social welfare, this dramatically reduces the
richness of results and the underlying strategic interaction between ﬁrms that appears when a
certain degree of cost savings are generated. For this reason, we believe that the inclusion of cost
savings plays a crucial role when evaluating the social desirability of (mixed) bundling activities
in markets for complemetary goods.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we considered two multiproduct ﬁrms that each sell two complementary prod-
ucts. They have to decide whether to ﬁx a price for each product separately or to adopt mixed
bundling. We assumed that selling the two products together in a package generates a (marginal)
cost reduction. The telecommunications sector provides a useful scenario to justify our theoretical
framework. In fact, the increasing digitalization of network services has enabled operators to pro-
vide a variety of retail services over a single platform, thus beneﬁting from signiﬁcant cost savings.
A report conducted by the OECD in 2011 revealed that broadband services in the OECD were
overwhelmingly sold as mixed bundles.17 Moreover, it reported examples of the costs of set-top
boxes to support the cost savings argument for the recent development of the telecommunications
sector. In fact, triple-play providers include now video, voice and data functionality into a single
set-top box, thus allowing for relevant cost savings.
Based on such stylized case, we analyzed a two-stage game in which ﬁrms had to decide
whether to adopt mixed bundling or separate pricing in the ﬁrst stage, and then had to compete
in prices in the second stage. We initially conﬁrmed that mixed bundling is a dominant strategy
for each player, and pointed out the interval regions in which ﬁrms were trapped in a prisoner’s
dilemma. Interestingly, we highlighted how the proﬁtability of mixed bundling crucially depends
on the interplay between the cost savings eﬀect and the degree of substitutability between systems.
In particular, in comparison with the benchmark case represented by separate pricing, when ﬁrms
adopt mixed bundling they enjoy a proﬁt gain in the bundled system, whereas they suﬀer from
a proﬁt loss in the hybrid systems. Moreover, we discovered that component prices and bundled
prices behave diﬀerently when product diﬀerentiation decreases. The former tend to increase,
while the bundle discount ﬁrst rises and then declines. When bundling generates suﬃciently
high cost savings, ﬁrms unambiguously gain. Furthermore, when cost synergies are extremely
profound, component prices are lower than in the case of separate selling. On the contrary, for low
17The data collection consisted of over 2, 000 oﬀers of stand-alone and bundled services from 90 ﬁrms across 30
OECD countries.
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levels of cost savings, bundling is proﬁtable for ﬁrms only when systems are highly substitutable,
as the bundle discount is low, whereas individual components become extremely expensive.
We also evaluated the social welfare consequences of adopting mixed bundling as compared to
the benchmark case represented by the case in which ﬁrms opt for separate pricing. We demon-
strated that mixed bundling maximizes social welfare when the cost savings eﬀect is suﬃciently
high. The social welfare analysis carried out in the paper also allowed us to evaluate consumer
surplus. Again, we showed that the parametric regions where the interests of producers and those
of consumers were not aligned depended on the degree of system substitutability. A case which
deserves particular attention occurs when systems are perceived as extremely substitutable. As
we highlighted above, component prices increase substantially, while the discount on the bundled
system is modest. In such scenario, consumers could be extremely penalized by the bundling
strategy adopted by the ﬁrms, unless a large cost savings eﬀect is generated.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The following Table represents the ﬁrst stage of the game, where ﬁrms have to decide whether
to resort to mixed bundling or not. The precise expressions of the equilibrium proﬁts are reported
in (8), (17), (18), and (24), respectively.
Table A: Payoﬀ matrix Firm 2
Firm 1
I B
I πII1 π
II
2 π
IB
1 π
IB
2
B πBI1 π
BI
2 π
BB
1 π
BB
2
First, it can be easily obtained that (mixed) bundling is a dominant strategy for both ﬁrms,
given that we can prove that: (i) πBI1 > π
II
1 and π
BB
1 > π
IB
1 ; (ii) π
IB
2 > π
II
2 and π
BB
2 > π
BI
2 .
Hence, the unique equilibrium is represented by both ﬁrms opting for such a strategy.
Secondly, turning to Pareto eﬃciency, we need to evaluate the following diﬀerence:
πBBi − πIIi =
1
9 (7− 17γ)2 (2− 5γ)2 ·Θ,
Θ = (7− 17γ)2 {32γ − c (1− 2γ) [146γ + 41c− γc (228− 319γ)− 50]− 17}
−9 (2− 5γ)2 8 (3− 5γ) [1 + c (−2 + 6γ)]2 .
For any given γ ∈ (0, 1/3), this expression is a second degree polynomial in c. When c = 0, this
polynomial is negative for γ ∈ (0, 0.308 ) and positive for γ ∈ (0.308, 1/3), as in Maruyama and
Minamikawa (2009). However, for each c > 0, the polynomial has two real roots,
cN± =

4727γ − 16107γ2 + γ3(23305− 11806γ)− 503	± 3 (7− 17γ) (2− 5γ)√2Ψ
18828γ − 96140γ2 + γ3(240458− 293781γ + 139618γ2)− 1447 ,
Ψ = (1− 3γ)(59− 364γ) + γ(699− 446γ) > 0 for each γ ∈ (0, 1/3).
By denoting with cN+ the bigger root and by c
N
− the lower one, it is possible to demonstrate
that cN+ > c¯ > c
N
− , and that c
N
− is non-negative when γ < 0.308. We can therefore discard c
N
+
and keep cN− ≡ cN . To sum up, πBBi ≥ πIIi always when γ ∈ (0.308 43, 1/3), and when c ≥ cN
in γ ≤ 0.308 , whereas πBBi < πIIi when c < cN , which can occur only for γ ≤ 0.308 .
Proof of Lemma 1
On the one hand, when both ﬁrms adopt mixed bundling, the proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 proﬁt can be
decomposed as follows:
πBB1 = π
BB
11 + π
BB
12 + π
BB
21
= (pBBB1 − c)qBB11 + (pBBα1 − c)qBB12 + (pBBβ1 − c)qBB21 ,
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with:
πBB11 =
[1− c (1− 3γ)]{3− 4γ + c[γ (17− 22γ)− 3]}
3 (2− 5γ)2 ,
πBB12 + π
BB
21 =
2[1− c (2− 4γ)][2− c (4− 11γ)]
9 (2− 5γ) .
On the other hand, in the benchmark case in which none of them bundled:
πII1 = π
II
11 + π
II
12 + π
II
21
= (pIIα1 + p
II
β
1
− 2c)qII11 + (pIIα1 − c)qII12 + (pIIβ1 − c)qII21 ,
with:
πII11 = π
II
12 + π
II
21 =
4 (3− 5γ) [1− c (2− 6γ)]2
(7− 17γ)2 .
It is straightforward to demonstrate that, under the basic assumptions of our model:
πBB11 − πII11 > 0,

πBB12 + π
BB
21
− πII12 + πII21

< 0.
It follows that multiproduct ﬁrm 1 gains from selling the bundled system, while it loses in the
hybrid systems in which it participates by selling one component. Moreover,
∂
πBB11 − πII11

∂γ
> 0,
∂
πBB12 + πBB21
− πII12 + πII21

∂γ
> 0
Hence, both the gain and the losses are increasing in the degree of system substitutability. Similar
results obviously hold for ﬁrm 2.
Finally,
∂
πBB11 − πII11

∂c
≥ 0 when c ∈ (0,
c],

c = γ
2[(7219− 4087γ)γ − 4690] + 1335γ − 141
(1− 3γ){4021γ − γ2[13929 + γ(11642γ − 21051)]− 429} < 1⇔ γ < 0.225;
∂
πBB12 + πBB21
− πII12 + πII21

∂c
< 0.
While the losses are always decreasing in the degree of cost savings, the gain in the bundled system
increases in c only when cost savings are not excessive, provided γ < 0.225. When γ ≥ 0.225, the
gain is always increasing in the intensity of cost savings, captured by c. In Figure 2 in the text
we considered the relevant case in which ∂
πBB11 − πII11
 /∂c ≥ 0. Similar results obviously hold
for ﬁrm 2.
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Proof of Lemma 2
In order to derive the consumer surplus, we assume that the utility function U of the repre-
sentative consumer is separable and linear in the numeraire good m:
U(q11, q12, q21, q22)
= m+ (λ+ µ)σ(q11 + q12 + q21 + q22)− λ− 2µ
2
(q211 + q
2
12 + q
2
21 + q
2
22)
−µ(q11q12 + q11q21 + q11q22 + q12q21 + q12q22 + q21q22),
where λ = η(η−3γ)(η+γ) =
1
(1−3γ)(1+γ) and µ =
γ
(η−3γ)(η+γ) =
γ
(1−3γ)(1+γ) , as we normalized to 1
both σ and η. We can then compute consumer surplus and social welfare, for each of the three
cases of interest.
In the benchmark case where both ﬁrms sell the stand alone products, consumer surplus
amounts to:
CSII =
2(3− 5γ)2[1 + 2c(3γ − 1)]2
(7− 17γ)2 (1− 3γ) ,
and social welfare is equal to:
SW II =
2(5γ − 3) (29γ − 11) [1 + 2c(3γ − 1)]2
(7− 17γ)2 (1− 3γ) .
In the second case, when only one ﬁrm adopts mixed bundling:
CSBI =
349 + γ {γ [3463 + 3γ (264γ − 925)]− 1837}
8 (1− 3γ) [11 + γ(24γ − 37)]2 +
+
c (1− 2γ) {γ [1950 + γ (744γ − 2105)]− 577}
4[11 + γ(24γ − 37)]2 +
c2 (1− 2γ)1033− 6552γ + γ2 [14061 + 2γ (1864γ − 6129)]
8[11 + γ(24γ − 37)]2 ,
SWBI =
1279 + γ

17101γ + 3γ2 (1560γ − 5023)− 7951	
8 (1− 3γ) [11 + γ(24γ − 37)]2 +
+
c

13744γ + γ2(26558γ − 8304γ2 − 2195)	
4[11 + γ(24γ − 37)]2 +
c2

4027 + 125911γ + 4γ3 [γ (38055− 10712γ)− 50717]− 36606
8[11 + γ(24γ − 37)]2 .
In the last case, where both ﬁrms adopt mixed bundling:
CSBB =
c (1− 2γ) [2 (32γ − 17) + c (1− 2γ) (25− 73γ)]
9 (2− 5γ)2 +
13 + γ (39γ − 46)
9 (1− 3γ) (2− 5γ)2 (31)
SWBB =
c (1− 2γ) (2 (178γ − 67) + c (107 + γ (784γ − 579)))
9 (2− 5γ)2 +
47 + γ (231γ − 212)
9 (1− 3γ) (2− 5γ)2 (32)
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Regarding social welfare, after tedious but rather straightforward computations, the following
ranking applies:
Figure A : Social welfare ranking
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Region A : SWBB > SWBI > SW II
Region B : SWBB > SW II > SWBI
Region C : SW II > SWBB > SWBI
Region D : SW II > SWBI > SWBB
It is interesting to notice that the asymmetric case is never optimal. The threshold values of
c that delimit the above interval regions are omitted for brevity, with the exception of cS, given
that it discriminates between the two relevant cases SWBB and SW II :
cS =
12974γ + γ2[8γ(7163− 3452γ)]− 1469 + 3(7− 17γ)(2− 5γ)√Ξ
γ2[γ(613115− 719778γ + 329848γ2)− 256073] + 52605γ − 4261 ,
Ξ = 1047− 8360γ + γ2[24259 + 2γ(7140γ − 15227)].
Regarding consumer surplus, a similar representation as Figure A can be obtained, although
with diﬀerent threshold values of c. We decided to omit it in order to reduce the length of the
paper. However, it is relatively easy to demonstrate that: (i) when c ≥ cC , consumer surplus is
at its highest when both ﬁrm bundle; (ii) when c < cC , consumer surplus is maximized under
independent selling. The threshold value cC is as follows:
cC =
γ[3520− 9543γ + 2γ2(5347− 2002γ)]− 463 + 3(7− 17γ)(2− 5γ)√Υ
γ {14949γ − γ2[63793− 132199γ + 4γ2(33054− 12653γ)]} − 1367 ,
Υ = 113− 626γ + γ2[1205 + 4γ(63γ − 235)].
Finally, cS ≥ cC when γ ≤ 0.295, and cS < cC when γ ∈ (0.295, 1/3].
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